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ABSTRACT
Testing propositions from ethnic competition theory, we examine contextual
and individual determinants of support for restrictive immigration policies in
26 European Union member states between 2002 and 2013, a period
characterized by enduring economic downturn. We hypothesize that natives
in vulnerable economic positions, similar to many migrants, are more
restrictive toward immigration, because they perceive more economic strain
and more ethnic threat. We expect that natives are more restrictive in times
of economic decline – when national unemployment rates and debts
increase – especially those who hold similar economic positions as many
migrants. We enriched European Social Survey data (2002–2013, containing
more than 210,000 respondents) with cross-national data on the economic
situation. We indeed find that support for immigration restrictiveness is
higher among natives in more vulnerable socio-economic positions. They
perceive more economic strain, which is directly related to restrictiveness.
But economic strain also increases perceptions of ethnic threat, which is
strongly related to restrictiveness. We do, however, not find strong empirical
evidence that economic decline more strongly affects support for restrictive
immigration policies among vulnerable economic groups. Stronger changes
in national debts induce more restrictiveness among the full population, but
especially among those who perceive more economic strain and more
ethnic threat.
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Introduction and research questions
The global financial-economic crisis that started in 2008 has affected
national economies and individual households throughout the European
Union (EU). Member states were confronted with higher levels of unem-
ployment and national debt, and individual households experienced a
steadily decline of purchasing power (Eurostat 2014a,d,f). Europe has
been confronted with severe economic insecurity, which potentially
affects intergroup relations (Billiet et al. 2014). Using individual-level
data from the European Social Survey (ESS), enriched with country
level data from Eurostat covering the long period from 2002 to 2013,
we examine to what extent recent changes in economic conditions
affect natives’ support for restrictive immigration policies, that is, individ-
uals and collectivities loudly sharing their views that immigration should
be put on hold. These data provide possibilities to test hypotheses rigor-
ously regarding the impact of severe changes in economic conditions on
immigration restrictiveness among vulnerable natives from many EU
member states. The data cover a longer period of time than previous con-
tributions examined.
Previous research has convincingly shown that especially vulnerable
economic groups hold restrictive views toward immigrants (Scheepers
et al. 2002; Kunovich 2004). Ethnic competition theory predicts that
natives who hold similar social positions as the majority of the migrant
population – such as manual workers, lower educated, unemployed, and
self-employed natives – compete more with migrants on the labor
market, and therefore perceive more ethnic threat. These threat percep-
tions induce antagonism toward immigrants (Scheepers et al. 2002).1
In this contribution, we fill two important lacunas in previous cross-
national research on anti-immigration attitudes. The first lacuna is on
the extent to which economic downturn fuels anti-immigrant sentiments
in Europe, especially among natives in vulnerable socio-economic pos-
itions. We therefore examine the impact of recent increases in unemploy-
ment rates and national government debts while controlling for a more
elaborate set of macro-economic and demographic indicators than pre-
vious research on anti-immigration attitudes has done. We assess the
impact of the level and changes in economic conditions simultaneously.
The second lacuna we aim to fill is to theorize and empirically examine
the mediating role of perceived economic strain in relation to the
1These groups are more likely to perceive more ethnic out-group threat, even if there is no actual
competition.
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previously empirically evidenced mediating role of perceived ethnic
threat. Ethnic competition theory traditionally predicts that vulnerable
economic groups perceive more ethnic threat, which translates into
more antagonism toward immigrants. Many researchers have used this
theoretical reasoning (e.g. Kunovich 2004; Schneider 2008; Schlueter
and Scheepers 2010). We take it one step further and address the role
of perceived economic strain in relation to anti-immigration sentiments
and perceived ethnic threat. Perceptions of economic strain concern per-
ceptions of economic vulnerability, that is, perceptions of failing to make
ends meet. Gesthuizen and Scheepers (2010) found that especially people
in vulnerable economic positions – such as unemployed, inactive, and
part-time working people and people with a lower socio-economic
status and/or lower level of educational attainment – perceive more econ-
omic strain. We will test to what extent and how perceived economic
strain is related to anti-immigration attitudes.
In this contribution, we answer four research questions. First, to what
extent can individual differences in support for restrictive immigration
policies among natives in the EU between 2002 and 2013 be explained
in terms of differences in individuals’ (vulnerable) socio-economic pos-
itions? Second, to what extent can socio-economic differences in
support for restrictive immigration policies be explained by perceived
economic strain and perceived ethnic threat? Third, to what extent can
cross-national differences in support for restrictive immigration policies
be explained in terms of recent changes in unemployment and national
government debt? Fourth, to what extent does the relation between, on
the one hand, individual socio-economic position and perceptions of
economic strain and ethnic threat and, on the other hand, support for
restrictive immigration policies vary with recent changes in unemploy-
ment and national government debt?
We innovate and improve upon previous research on anti-immigration
attitudes in several ways. First, we compiled a comprehensive longitudinal
database, containing information of more than 210,000 individuals from
26 EU member states, covering a period of more than a decade, which
is longer than previous studies. Second, we conduct more elaborate ana-
lyses: we examine the impact of a more elaborate set of macro-economic
and demographic indicators and examine the impact of the level of and
changes in economic conditions simultaneously. Third, we disentangle
the theoretical mechanisms that explain the negative relation between vul-
nerable socio-economic positions and anti-immigration attitudes. Fourth,
we examine a more elaborate set of cross-level interactions between
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changes in national economic conditions and individual’s socio-
economic position as well as their perceptions of economic strain and
ethnic threat.
Theoretical framework and hypotheses
We derive hypotheses from ethnic competition theory (Scheepers et al.
2002; Schneider 2008) to explain individual and cross-national differences
in support for restrictive immigration policies. This theory posits that
ethnic competition, at the individual level as well as at the contextual
level, increases perceptions of ethnic out-group threat, which in turn
increase antagonism toward immigrants among ethnic majority
members (Blalock 1967; Scheepers et al. 2002). The competition may be
objectively assessable or only subjectively perceived (Blalock 1967), but
what matters is that individuals who experience ethnic competition are
expected to perceive more ethnic threat (McLaren 2003; Schlueter and
Scheepers 2010). Ethnic competition theory predicts that these percep-
tions are especially present among vulnerable economic groups who
hold similar positions to ethnic minorities in general and even more so
in times of economic decline (Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002;
Billiet et al. 2014).
Individual differences in support for restrictive immigration policies
Previous research has supported the hypothesis that individuals in vulner-
able economic positions – the lower educated, manual workers, the unem-
ployed, and the self-employed – are more exclusionist toward immigrants
(Scheepers et al. 2002; Schneider 2008; Mewes and Mau 2013; Billiet et al.
2014). In terms of ethnic competition theory, indicators of ethnic compe-
tition are expected to increase perceived ethnic threat among natives in
similar economic positions as migrants, which in turn increases their
restrictiveness toward immigration (Schlueter and Scheepers 2010). In
line with previous research, we hypothesize that support for restrictive
immigration policies is stronger among (a) natives with a lower level of edu-
cational attainment, (b) native manual workers, (c) unemployed natives,
and (d) self-employed natives (H1a), because they perceive more ethnic
threat (H1b).
Ethnic competition theory strongly emphasizes the role of ethnic com-
petition and the consequent perceptions of ethnic threat that drive anti-
immigrant sentiments. We argue that vulnerable socio-economic groups
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not only perceive more ethnic threat, but also more economic strain
(Gesthuizen and Scheepers 2010), which in turn affects their restrictive-
ness toward immigration. In a context of ethnic competition over scarce
jobs and welfare resources, socio-economic differences in restrictive
immigration stances may be explained by perceptions of economic
strain in two distinct ways. First, economically strained natives could
have more or less rational reasons to be restrictive toward immigrants.
Natives who face economic hardship will try to keep jobs or look for
better jobs; or, in cases of unemployment, will claim welfare benefits. It
is in their personal interest to limit the number of competitors in the
labor market and the welfare state (Malchow-Moller et al. 2008). Migrants
compete particularly with economically vulnerable natives in the labor
market as well as in the realm of the welfare state, because compared to
natives they have lower labor market resources and a stronger dependency
on welfare benefits (Brücker et al. 2002; Barret and McCarthy 2008).
Hence, economically vulnerable natives may support restrictive immigra-
tion policies because they think that immigration deteriorates their econ-
omic opportunities and entitlements. We hypothesize that support for
restrictive immigration policies is stronger among (a) natives with a
lower level of educational attainment, (b) native manual workers, (c)
unemployed natives, and (d) self-employed natives, because they perceive
more economic strain (H1c).
Second, to take the argument one step further building on classic theor-
etical mechanisms (Berkowitz 1988): natives who face economic hardship
inducing frustration may also respond by blaming immigrants for their
possible or future misfortune (Rothschild et al. 2012). They may ‘scape-
goat’ ethnic out-groups, because they are currently highly salient groups
in political and societal debates.2 Hence economically strained natives
may consider ethnic out-groups a threat to the economic interests of
the ethnic in-group. We therefore expect that natives who perceive econ-
omic strain consequentially also perceive more ethnic threat, and for that
reason they would be more restrictive toward immigration. We hypoth-
esize that support for restrictive immigration policies is stronger among
(a) natives with a lower level of educational attainment, (b) native
manual workers, (c) unemployed natives, and (d) self-employed natives,
because they perceive more economic strain and therefore more ethnic
threat (H1d).
2For instance, ethnicity is salient in debates about immigration, welfare entitlement, and criminality. The
scapegoating implies that the target group that is scapegoated can be changed. Should other groups
become more salient in one way or the other, the scapegoating may be directed at these groups.
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Changes in unemployment and national debt
Ethnic competition theory is especially suitable to explain antagonism
toward immigrants in times of competitive economic circumstances.
Economic conditions affect the degree of perceived ethnic competition
over scarce economic resources such as employment and a share of the
national welfare (Quillian 1995; Semyonov et al. 2008). The unemploy-
ment rate reflects scarcity of employment, which indicates ethnic labor
market competition. The national government debt indicates the long-
term and short-term sustainability of the financial position of national
governments and thereby the economic and political relevance of auster-
ity. In recent years, EU member states with sharp increases of national
debt – such as Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain – had to be
financially supported by other EU member states and financial insti-
tutions such as the International Monetary Fund, in exchange for austerity
measures to decrease the annual national debt and hereby improve the
sustainability of the government finances (European Central Bank
2015). Within countries, people in vulnerable socio-economic positions
are strongly affected by both the unemployment rate and national govern-
ment’s austerity measures than people in higher positions. The former are,
on average, more at risk of being or becoming unemployed (Eurostat
2015) and budget cuts have a relative stronger effect on their income pos-
ition because they receive more (frequently) support from the government
(Eurostat 2014e). Previous research on the relation between macro-econ-
omic conditions and anti-immigrant attitudes used a limited set of macro-
economic indicators, namely (changes in) national welfare and unemploy-
ment rate. Some studies found less antagonism toward immigrants in
economically more affluent countries (Schneider 2008; Semyonov et al.
2008; Billiet et al. 2014), although other studies did not establish a signifi-
cant association (Semyonov et al. 2006; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009;
Meuleman et al. 2009). With regard to the unemployment rate, many
studies did not find a significant association with anti-immigrant attitudes
(Scheepers et al. 2002; Sides and Citrin 2007; Meuleman et al. 2009; Billiet
et al. 2014). However, Coenders and Scheepers (2008) established a posi-
tive association between change in unemployment in the past five years
and antagonism toward immigrants.
Following Olzak (1994) and Meuleman et al. (2009), we argue that
sudden economic changes may shock the native population. A constant
high level of competition may not affect antagonism toward immigrants,
but if economic conditions suddenly deteriorate, people may become
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more antagonistic toward ethnic out-groups (Meuleman et al. 2009;
Turner and Cross 2015). People might be overwhelmed – shocked – by
these sudden economic changes and its (actual and perceived) conse-
quences for the labor market and welfare state, because there was little
time to absorb the changes (Olzak 1994). People may be exposed directly
and indirectly and, moreover, alarmingly via media messages (Hopkins
2007). In this vein, Schlueter and Davidov (2013) showed that negative
immigration-related news reports increased perceived group threat, over
and beyond immigrant group sizes. In times of higher levels of unemploy-
ment and national government debt, employment and government
resources generally become scarcer.3 We expect that short-term economic
deterioration increases perceptions of economic strain and ethnic threat,
which is in turn related to more restrictiveness toward immigrants. We
hypothesize that support for restrictive immigration policies is stronger in
countries that experienced a stronger increase of (a) unemployment and
(b) national government debt (H2).
Following the reasoning of Scheepers et al. (2002), we propose that
natives differ in the degree to which economic conditions affect their
support for restrictive immigration policies. In times of stronger economic
decline, natives who are generally more vulnerable and therefore more
likely to perceive economic strain and ethnic threat are expected to
support restrictive immigration policies more strongly. Hence, we
expect that differences in support between economic groups are larger
in times of stronger economic decline. We hypothesize that support for
restrictive immigration policies is stronger among (a) natives with a
lower level of educational attainment, (b) native manual workers, (c)
unemployed natives, and (d) self-employed natives, especially in countries
that experienced a stronger increase of (i) unemployment and (ii) national
government debt (H3).
We further expect that natives who perceive more economic strain
and/or ethnic threat are more restrictive in times of recent economic
decline. In times of scarcity those who feel threatened and/or econ-
omically strained may feel even more strained or threatened, and
therefore have a more urgent need to limit the number of immi-
grants. We therefore hypothesize that support for restrictive immigra-
tion policies is stronger among (a) natives who perceive more economic
strain and (b) natives who perceive more ethnic threat, especially in
3Government resources become scarcer if national debt increases, because EU member states are obliged
to strive to a yearly budget deficit of less than 3% (Council Regulation 679/2010).
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countries that experienced a stronger increase of (i) unemployment and
(ii) national government debt (H4). Our hypotheses are summarized
in Figure 1.
Data, measurements, and analytical strategy
Data description
Data on support for restrictive immigration policies and individuals’ econ-
omic position were derived from the ESS. The ESS is a biennial multi-
country survey. What makes the ESS unique in cross-national research
is its aim to meet the highest methodological standards. In order for the
information gathered to be truly comparable across all countries involved,
Figure 1. Overview of hypotheses.
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the survey employs the highest standards in its approach to sample design,
response rates, questionnaire design, and fieldwork procedures across all
participating countries. The target group encompassed all persons over
15 years of age who live in a private household in one of the participating
countries. The individual chance of selection is independent of nationality,
legal status, citizenship, or language. Respondents were randomly drawn
from the population of individuals within each country, in order to
reach representativeness of each sample. We use the most recent data of
six ESS waves (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012). Our data are struc-
tured in three levels: individuals are nested in country-year combinations,
which are in turn nested in countries. We selected all countries that were
EU member states during at least half of the data collection period (2002–
2013), hence all countries that were a member on 1 January 2007. From
these 27 countries, 26 countries participated in at least 1 wave of the
ESS. Only Malta did not participate in any wave. We selected all
country-year combinations that were available (ncy = 119). From each
country-year combination, we only selected native-born respondents (ni
= 210,247), because the sampling procedure was not designed to optimize
population representativeness among migrants. In addition, migrants may
have different interpretations or interests with regard to support for
restrictive immigration policies.4 The country-year variables were
derived from Eurostat (2014a,b,c,f). The indicators were standardized
across countries and over time, which makes them highly comparable
and equivalent. In our analyses, we control for the levels of immigration,
unemployment, national government debt, and for recent changes in
immigration.
Individual-level variables
The dependent variable support for restrictive immigration policies is
measured by three items: ‘to what extent do you think [country] should
allow a) people of the same race or ethnic group as most [country]’s
people to come and live here?; b) people of a different race or ethnic
group from most [country] people?; and c) people from the poorer
countries outside Europe?’. After recoding, response categories ranged
from (0) ‘allow many to come and live here’ to (3) ‘allow none’. Perceived
ethnic threat is, just like Coenders et al. (2013, 2014), measured by three
items: (1) ‘Would you say it is generally bad or good for [country]’s
4The number of respondents for each country-year combination is presented in Appendix 1.
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economy that people come to live here from other countries?’; (2) ‘Would
you say that [country]’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched
by people coming to live here from other countries?’; (3) ‘Is [country]
made a worse or a better place to live by people coming to live here
from other countries?’. For these items, the response scale was reversed,
so 0 indicated no perceived ethnic threat and 10 indicated maximum per-
ceived ethnic threat.5 Perceived economic strain is, just like Visser et al.
(2013), measured with a single item: ‘Which of the descriptions on this
card comes closest to how you feel about your household’s income nowa-
days?’ The response categories were (1) ‘living comfortably on present
income’, (2) ‘coping on present income’, (3) ‘finding it difficult on
present income’, and (4) ‘finding it very difficult on present income’.
The level of education is measured as the highest level of education
respondents achieved, coded in the following ordered categories: 0, ‘Less
than lower secondary education (ISCED 0–1)’; 1, ‘Lower secondary edu-
cation completed (ISCED 2)’; 2, ‘Upper secondary education completed
(ISCED 3)’; 3, ‘Post-secondary non-tertiary education completed (ISCED
4)’; 4, ‘Tertiary education completed (ISCED 5–6)’. This variable is
included in a linear fashion. Employment status is measured nominally,
with the categories ‘non-manual worker’, ‘manual worker’, ‘self-employed’,
‘unemployed’, ‘retired’, and ‘not in labor market for other reasons’. Non-
manual workers are the reference category. We focus on differences in
support with manual workers, the self-employed and unemployed
people. At the individual level, we control for variables that were previously
found to be related to antagonism toward immigrants: religiosity (indi-
cated by frequency of church attendance), age, and gender (cf. McFarland
1989; Billiet 1995; Coenders and Scheepers 2008; Semyonov et al. 2008).
Contextual independent variables
Unemployment rate is measured as the natural logarithm of country’s
annually average percentage of people who were unemployed in the
5Before researchers can adequately and validly examine causal interrelations between latent constructs, its
level of measurement equivalence should be established (Van de Vijver and Leung 1997). This rule
applies to all types of analyses where groups of respondents from different countries and at different
points in time are examined. Unfortunately, the number of groups specified in a multiple group
measurement model is limited. Therefore it is not possible to directly assess the level of measurement
equivalence across all country-years in one multiple group model. Using χ2-based fit indices, we estab-
lished partial metric invariance across countries within each wave of the ESS for both support for restric-
tive immigration policies and perceived ethnic threat (see Appendix 2). We calculated Likert mean scores
for support for restrictive immigration policies and perceived ethnic threat to decrease the number of par-
ameters that need to be estimated.
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year of survey. Unemployed persons are all persons 15–74 years of age
who were not employed during the reference week, had actively sought
work during the past 4 weeks, and were ready to begin working immedi-
ately or within 2 weeks (Eurostat 2014f). National debt is measured as the
natural logarithm of the general government gross debt expressed in per-
centages of GDP in the year of survey. Government debt is defined in the
Maastricht Treaty as consolidated general government gross debt of the
whole general government sector at nominal value, outstanding at the
end of the year. The general government sector comprises central govern-
ment, state government, local government, and social security funds. The
relevant definitions are provided in Council Regulation 479/2009, as
amended by Council Regulation 679/2010. Data for the general govern-
ment sector are consolidated between sub-sectors at the national level.
The series are measured in percentage of GDP (Eurostat 2014a). The
level of immigration is measured as the natural logarithm of the
number of immigrants per 1000 inhabitants aged 15–64 (the working
population) (Eurostat 2014b,c). ‘Immigration’ denotes the action by
which a person establishes his or her usual residence in the territory of
a member state (of the EU) for a period that is, or is expected to be, of
at least 12 months, having previously been usually resident in another
member state (of the EU) or a third country. Change in unemployment,
national debt, and immigration is measured as the absolute difference
between the year of survey and the preceding year. The differences are cal-
culated with the operationalizations described above.6
Analytical strategy
Individuals (ni = 210,247) are nested in country-year combinations (ncy =
119), which are in turn nested in countries (nc = 26). We therefore con-
ducted two-level hierarchical ordinary least squares (OLS) structural
equation modeling (level 1: native individuals; level 2: country-years) in
Mplus 7.31 (Muthén and Muthén 1998–2015). We computed robust stan-
dard errors for the country-year level parameters, in order to take into
account the stratification and non-independence of country-year obser-
vations. We dealt with missing values on individual-level variables by
means of multiple imputation and created 100 new datasets with imputed
data (Graham et al. 2007). For each respondent we calculated the mean
score support for restrictive immigration policies and perceived ethnic
6The mean and standard deviation of support for each country-year combination are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1. Mean support for restrictive immigration policies per country-year (Ni = 210,247; Ncy = 119; Nc = 26; average results of 100 multiple imputed
datasets).
Country/year 2002/2003 2004/2005 2006/2007 2008/2009 2010/2011 2012/2013 (Country)
Austria 1.640 (0.715) 1.427 (0.774) 1.507 (0.737) 1.444 (0.770) 1.505 (0.754)
Belgium 1.429 (0.742) 1.475 (0.795) 1.380 (0.746) 1.325 (0.756) 1.459 (0.774) 1.383 (0.707) 1.408 (0.755)
Bulgaria 1.197 (0.929) 1.318 (0.939) 1.258 (0.936)
Cyprus 1.954 (0.590) 1.734 (0.481) 1.943 (0.676) 2.175 (0.613) 1.944 (0.612)
Czech Republic 1.543 (0.727) 1.681 (0.795) 1.739 (0.740) 1.773 (0.771) 1.798 (0.772) 1.717 (0.771)
Denmark 1.360 (0.668) 1.379 (0.682) 1.292 (0.650) 1.285 (0.673) 1.236 (0.662) 1.261 (0.673) 1.301 (0.670)
Estonia 1.776 (0.764) 1.715 (0.750) 1.646 (0.774) 1.552 (0.731) 1.508 (0.727) 1.630 (0.755)
Finland 1.539 (0.679) 1.564 (0.670) 1.547 (0.658) 1.461 (0.677) 1.630 (0.646) 1.463 (0.650) 1.531 (0.666)
France 1.503 (0.725) 1.436 (0.703) 1.459 (0.717) 1.383 (0.728) 1.445 (0.719)
Germany 1.320 (0.696) 1.493 (0.786) 1.466 (0.769) 1.198 (0.754) 1.249 (0.741) 1.045 (0.669) 1.296 (0.753)
Greece 2.007 (0.753) 2.007 (0.753)
Hungary 1.854 (0.625) 1.945 (0.756) 1.981 (0.720) 1.837 (0.703) 1.811 (0.727) 1.868 (0.751) 1.881 (0.718)
Ireland 1.243 (0.670) 1.239 (0.753) 1.231 (0.737) 1.405 (0.779) 1.587 (0.870) 1.513 (0.845) 1.379 (0.797)
Italy 1.258 (0.801) 1.398 (0.849) 1.234 (0.860) 1.311 (0.840)
Latvia 1.879 (0.923) 1.865 (0.884) 1.872 (0.904)
Lithuania 1.376 (0.817) 1.201 (0.868) 1.309 (0.816) 1.301 (0.834)
Luxembourg 1.556 (0.791) 1.500 (0.784) 1.527 (0.788)
The Netherlands 1.425 (0.668) 1.478 (0.729) 1.509 (0.754) 1.332 (0.705) 1.373 (0.728) 1.370 (0.750) 1.416 (0.723)
Poland 1.361 (0.690) 1.261 (0.775) 1.075 (0.776) 1.047 (0.738) 1.062 (0.741) 1.095 (0.766) 1.158 (0.757)
Portugal 1.775 (0.803) 1.894 (0.775) 1.904 (0.848) 1.838 (0.847) 1.805 (0.803) 1.919 (0.861) 1.860 (0.827)
Romania 1.439 (0.944) 1.439 (0.944)
Slovakia 1.264 (0.827) 1.266 (0.847) 1.387 (0.867) 1.552 (0.861) 1.606 (0.864) 1.423 (0.866)
Slovenia 1.434 (0.701) 1.457 (0.779) 1.461 (0.755) 1.389 (0.739) 1.373 (0.732) 1.357 (0.798) 1.414 (0.751)
Spain 1.420 (0.814) 1.393 (0.837) 1.540 (0.854) 1.665 (0.830) 1.509 (0.863) 1.340 (0.890) 1.491 (0.855)
Sweden 0.889 (0.645) 0.893 (0.702) 0.822 (0.667) 0.782 (0.655) 0.737 (0.622) 0.818 (0.654) 0.828 (0.661)
United Kingdom 1.531 (0.746) 1.495 (0.755) 1.589 (0.755) 1.556 (0.743) 1.631 (0.793) 1.665 (0.781) 1.581 (0.765)
(Wave) 1.437 (0.743) 1.479 (0.803) 1.499 (0.811) 1.451 (0.817) 1.514 (0.817) 1.442 (0.828) 1.470 (0.807)
Source: ESS pooled dataset wave 1 (2002/2003); wave 2 (2004/2005), wave 3 (2006/2007), wave 4 (2008/2009), wave 5 (2010/2011), wave 6 (2012/2013). Author’s calculations.
Note: Standard deviations are given in brackets.
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threat.7 All independent variables were grand-mean centered. We used the
maximum likelihood estimation with robust standard errors and the expec-
tation–maximization algorithm. In the models with cross-level interactions
between changes in unemployment, respectively, national debt and individ-
uals’ economic position, perceived economic strain, and perceived ethnic
threat, the effects of the relevant individual-level variables were made
random across country-years. In the mediation models, we specified per-
ceived economic strain and perceived ethnic threat as mediating variables
that were predicted by education and employment status (the categories
manual worker, unemployed, and self-employed), that in turn predict
support for restrictive immigration policies. Perceived economic strain is
also modeled to have an effect on perceived ethnic threat.
Results
Country differences in support for restrictive immigration policies
Member states of the EU substantially differ in the degree of public support
for restrictive immigration policies. On a scale from 0 to 3, the average value
of support is 1.470, which means that, in the period 2002–2013, EU natives
wished to allow ‘a few’ to ‘some’ people from other countries (see Table 1).
There is substantial between-country variation, and some overtime vari-
ation within and between countries. Public support for restrictive immigra-
tion policies is, on average between 2002 and 2013, lowest in Sweden (m =
0.828), Poland (m = 1.158), Bulgaria (m = 1.258), Germany (m = 1.296), and
Denmark (m = 1.301), and it is highest in Greece (m = 2.007), Cyprus (m =
1.944), Hungary (m = 1.881), Latvia (m = 1.872), and Portugal (m = 1.860).
Across all years of participation in the ESS, the most restrictive country,
Greece, experienced stronger increases of unemployment and national
debt compared to the least restrictive country, Sweden. In terms of bivariate
correlations, changes in unemployment (r = 0.173) and national debt (r =
0.263) are stronger related to support for restrictive immigration policies
than changes in immigration, and the levels of unemployment, national
debt, and immigration (see Appendix 3).
We highlight some remarkable changes in support within and between
countries. In Estonia, Germany, and Poland, support gradually declined
over time. The economies of these countries generally grew in that
period. Public support for restrictive immigration policies increased in
7The individual-level and contextual-level correlations can be found in Appendix 3.
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Cyprus and Ireland. Just like Greece, these countries experienced econ-
omic difficulties and needed substantial support from the International
Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank. In other countries,
there are less pronounced changes in mean support over time.
Individual differences in support for restrictive immigration policies
The differences in support for restrictive immigration policies between
native individuals from different economic groups are presented in the
upper half of Model 1 in Table 2. In accordance with H1, we find that
the lower educated are more restrictive toward immigration than
the higher educated (γ =−0.096, p < .001). Next, native manual workers
(γ = 0.144, p < .001), unemployed natives (γ = 0.184, p < .001), and self-
employed natives (γ = 0.073, p < .001) are more restrictive than native
non-manual workers. Furthermore, retired natives (γ = 0.102, p < .001)
and natives who are not in the labor market (γ = 0.116, p < .001) are
more restrictive than native non-manual workers. These findings are in
accordance with propositions from ethnic competition theory. We
further find that older natives (γ = 0.005, p < .001) are more restrictive
than younger natives, while we do not find statistically significant
effects of church attendance and gender.
Mediating effects of perceived economic strain and perceived ethnic
threat
In Model 4 of Table 2, we have a first look at the parameters of the
mediators’ perceived economic strain and perceived ethnic threat that
actually turn out to be significant (0.022, respectively, 0.213). Moreover,
in Table 3, we present the results of the mediation analyses.8
There are three mediating mechanisms (see Appendix 4). First, we find
that the lower educated perceive more ethnic threat than the higher edu-
cated (γ =−0.297, p < .001), and that manual workers perceive more
ethnic threat than non-manual workers (γ = 0.113. p < .001). The
8According to Preacher and Hayes (2004), a variable is considered a mediator if (1) X significantly predicts
Y, (2) X significantly predicts M, and (3) M significantly predicts Y controlling for X. Furthermore, the
mediator should be measured without error, and Y should not cause M (non-recursive effect). We
can only assume that perceived economic strain is measured without error, because it is measured
by only one item. Given our theoretical model, we think it is not plausible that support for restrictive
immigration policies would induce more perceived ethnic threat or more perceived economic
strain.). All effects of the Xs of interest on Y, all but two effects of X on M, and both effects of M on
Y are statistically significant (see Appendix 4). Hence, our mediation model largely meets the criteria
of Preacher and Hayes (2004). The full model can be found in Appendix 4.
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Table 2. Hierarchical OLS regression estimates of individual support for restrictive
immigration policies on individual and country-year characteristics (Ni = 210,247; Ncy =
119; Nc = 26; average results of 100 multiple imputed datasets).
γ SE γ SE γ SE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Intercept 1.473 (0.046)*** 1.473 (0.045)*** 1.473 (0.045)***
Individual-level variables
Education −0.096 (0.006)*** −0.156 (0.055)** −0.157 (0.055)**
Non-manual worker (ref.)
Manual worker 0.144 (0.010)*** 0.364 (0.644) 0.364 (0.648)
Unemployed 0.184 (0.023)*** 0.931 (0.915) 0.927 (0.921)
Self-employed 0.073 (0.009)*** −0.523 (1.902) 0.553 (1.940)
Retired 0.102 (0.011)*** 0.104 (0.011)*** 0.104 (0.011)***
Not in labor market 0.116 (0.009)*** 0.118 (0.009)*** 0.119 (0.009)***
Church attendance −0.007 (0.005) −0.007 (0.005) −0.007 (0.005)
Age 0.005 (0.001)*** 0.005 (0.001)*** 0.005 (0.001)***
Female 0.007 (0.012) 0.005 (0.012) 0.005 (0.012)
Country-year-level variables
Δ Unemployment rate 0.016 (0.021) 0.018 (0.020) 0.023 (0.019)
*Education −0.002 (0.002)
*Manual worker 0.001 (0.007)
*Unemployed 0.014 (0.010)∼
*Self-employed 0.005 (0.005)
Δ National debt 0.011 (0.007)∼ 0.007 (0.007) 0.008 (0.007)
*Education −0.001 (0.000)
*Manual worker 0.000 (0.001)
*Unemployed 0.002 (0.002)
*Self-employed −0.002 (0.001)∼
Δ Immigration −0.012 (0.006)* −0.010 (0.004)* −0.010 (0.004)*
Unemployment rate −0.012 (0.006)* −0.017 (0.005)** −0.017 (0.005)**
National debt 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Immigration −0.003 (0.005) −0.002 (0.004) −0.002 (0.004)
−2 Log likelihood 468,340 1,242,502 1,242,502
BIC 468,560 1,242,919 1,242,918
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Intercept 0.354 (0.042)*** −0.140 (0.331) −0.141 (0.333)
Individual-level variables
Education −0.030 (0.006)*** −0.030 (0.003)*** −0.030 (0.003)
Non-manual worker (ref.)
Manual worker 0.054 (0.006)*** 0.054 (0.006)*** 0.054 (0.006)***
Unemployed 0.050 (0.010)*** 0.048 (0.009)*** 0.048 (0.009)***
Self-employed 0.045 (0.006)*** 0.045 (0.006)*** 0.045 (0.006)***
Retired 0.035 (0.006)*** 0.037 (0.007)*** 0.037 (0.007)***
Not in labor market 0.041 (0.007)*** 0.044 (0.007)*** 0.044 (0.007)***
Church attendance −0.001 (0.003) −0.001 (0.003) −0.001 (0.003)
Age 0.004 (0.000)*** 0.004 (0.000)*** 0.004 (0.000)***
Female −0.014 (0.008)* −0.014 (0.008)* −0.014 (0.008)*
Perceived economic strain 0.022 (0.005)*** 0.149 (0.102)∼ 0.149 (0.102)∼
Perceived ethnic threat 0.213 (0.004)*** 0.040 (0.069) 0.040 (0.069)
Country-year-level variables
Δ Unemployment rate 0.005 (0.015) 0.000 (0.019) 0.003 (0.014)
*Economic strain 0.002 (0.002)
*Ethnic threat −0.001 (0.002)
Δ National debt 0.006 (0.004)∼ 0.004 (0.003)∼ −0.004 (0.004)
*Economic strain 0.001 (0.001)∼
*Ethnic threat 0.001 (0.000)**
(Continued )
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unemployed and the self-employed do not perceive more or less ethnic
threat than non-manual workers. In turn, we find in Table 3 that those,
who perceive more ethnic threat, are more supportive of restrictive immi-
gration policies (indirect effects are γ =−0.063, respectively, 0.024, p
< .05). Our findings support H1b regarding the lower educated and
manual workers, but not for the unemployed and the self-employed.
Second, we find in Appendix 4 that the lower educated (γ =−0.137, p
< .001), manual workers (γ = 0.104, p < .001), and the unemployed (γ =
0.723, p < .001) perceive more economic strain, while the self-employed
perceive less strain (γ =−0.126, p < .001). In turn, we find in Table 3
that those who perceive more economic strain are more supportive of
restrictive immigration policies (indirect effects are −0.003 (p < .001),
0.002 (p < .01), 0.016 (p < .001), and −0.003 (p < .01) for, respectively,
education, manual workers, the unemployed, and the self-employed.
These findings confirm H1c. Third, we find in Appendix 4 that those
who perceive more economic strain actually perceive more ethnic threat
(β = 0.407, p < .001), which in turn increases support for restrictive immi-
gration policies. So we find in Table 3 that lower educated (−0.012, p
< .001), manual workers (0.009, p < .001), and the unemployed (0.063, p
< .001) are more supportive of restrictive immigration policies, because
they perceive more ethnic threat, that is fueled by perceptions of economic
strain. The self-employed (−0.011, p < .01) are less supportive because
they perceive less ethnic threat fueled by economic strain. We find that
about 80% of the effect of perceived economic strain (β = 0.109, p
< .001) is mediated by perceived ethnic threat (β = 0.087, p < .001).
These findings corroborate H1d.
For matters of clarity, Figure 2 shows the mediating mechanisms of the
relation between educational attainment and support for restrictive
Table 2. Continued.
γ SE γ SE γ SE
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Δ Immigration −0.007 (0.003)* −0.006 (0.004)∼ −0.006 (0.004)∼
Unemployment rate −0.008 (0.004)* −0.011 (0.007)* −0.011 (0.007)*
National debt 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Immigration 0.000 (0.004) 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.003)
−2 Log likelihood 391,353 1,717,941 1,717,935
BIC 391,598 1,718,296 1,718,290
Source: ESS’s wave 1 (2002/2003), wave 2 (2004/2005); wave 3 (2006/2007), wave 4 (2008/2009), wave 5
(2010/2011), and wave 6 (2012/2013). Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Unstandardized effects are presented, standard errors are given in brackets. All exogenous variables
are grand-mean centered. The effects of education, manual worker, unemployed, and self-employed are
random across country-years in Models 2 and 3. The effects of perceived economic strain and perceived
ethnic threat are random across country-years in Models 5 and 6. ∼p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Table 3. Decomposition of direct, indirect, and total individual effects of individual socio-economic position on restrictiveness toward immigrants (Ni =
210,247; Ncy = 119; Nc = 26; average results of 100 multiple imputed datasets).
Dependent variable: Restrictiveness toward immigrants
Independent variable: Education Manual worker Unemployed Self-employed Economic strain
Direct effect −0.030 (0.003)*** 0.054 (0.006)*** 0.050 (0.010)*** 0.045 (0.006)*** 0.022 (0.005)***
Indirect effects (total) −0.078 (0.006)*** 0.035 (0.009)*** 0.098 (0.018)*** −0.020 (0.010)* 0.087 (0.012)***
Perceived economic strain −0.003 (0.001)*** 0.002 (0.001)** 0.016 (0.004)*** −0.003 (0.001)**
Strain via ethnic threat −0.012 (0.002)*** 0.009 (0.002)*** 0.063 (0.010)*** −0.011 (0.004)**
Perceived ethnic threat −0.063 (0.005)*** 0.024 (0.007)*** 0.019 (0.012) −0.007 (0.009) 0.087 (0.012)***
Total effect −0.108 (0.007)*** 0.089 (0.011)*** 0.148 (0.026)*** 0.025 (0.012)* 0.109 (0.012)***
Source: ESS’s wave 1 (2002/2003), wave 2 (2004/2005); wave 3 (2006/2007), wave 4 (2008/2009), wave 5 (2010/2011), and wave 6 (2012/2013). Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Unstandardized effects are presented (standard errors are given in brackets). All exogenous variables are grand-mean centered. ∼p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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immigration policies. Natives with a lower level of education are more
supportive of restrictive immigration policies (γ =−0.030, p < .001).
They perceive more economic strain (γ =−0.137, p < .001) and more
ethnic threat (γ =−0.297, p < .001). Economic strain directly induces
support (β = 0.022, p < .001), but also induces ethnic threat (β = 0.407, p
< .001). In turn, ethnic threat induces support for restrictive immigration
policies (β = 0.213, p < .001).
In terms of to what extent the effects of socio-economic position are
mediated by perceived economic strain and ethnic threat, we find that,
respectively, 72%, 39%, and 66% of the effects of education, manual
work, and unemployment are explained by economic strain and ethnic
threat. Interestingly, the indirect effect of education (γ =−0.078, p
< .001) and manual work (γ = 0.035, p < .001) runs mainly via perceived
ethnic threat (γ =−.063, p < .001, resp., γ = 0.024, p < .001), while the
indirect effect of unemployment (γ = 0.098, p < .001) mainly runs via
economic strain through economic threat (γ = 0.063, p < .001). Thus,
unemployed natives perceive more economic strain, which induces per-
ceived ethnic threat, which in turn induces their support of restrictive
immigration policies. We further find a negative indirect effect of self-
employment. The main reason for this effect is that self-employed
Figure 2. Relation between educational attainment and anti-immigration attitudes.
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natives perceive less economic strain (γ = 0.126, p < .001), which also
decreases their perceived ethnic threat.
Changes in unemployment and national debt
The effects of national economic conditions on support for restrictive
immigration policies are presented in the bottom half of Model 1 in
Table 2. In accordance with H2b, we find that in countries that experienced
a stronger recent increase of national government debt (γ = 0.011, p < .10),
natives more strongly support restrictive immigration policies. The effect
of the increase of unemployment is not statistically significant (γ = 0.016,
p > .10), refuting H2a. Regarding the macro-level control variables, we
find that the effects of immigration change and unemployment rate (both
γ =−0.012, p < .05) are contrary to what we would expect. The effects of
national debt level and immigration level are not statistically significant.
The cross-level interactions between individual’s socio-economic pos-
ition and changes in unemployment and national debt are presented in
Model 2 and Model 3 of Table 2. We find that unemployed natives are
somewhat more supportive of restrictive immigration policies in times
of a stronger increase of unemployment (γ = 0.014, p < .10). This finding
is in accordance with H3c. Furthermore, self-employed natives are less
restrictive in times of a stronger increase of national debt (γ =−0.002, p
< .10). This finding refutes H3d. More in general, there is little empirical
support for our hypothesis that specific economic groups are more restric-
tive in times of stronger economic decline.
In Models 4–6 of Table 2, we present the unconditional and conditional
effects of perceived economic strain and perceived ethnic threat. We
already saw that natives who perceive more economic strain (γ = 0.022,
p < .001) and more ethnic threat (γ = 0.213, p < .001) are more supportive
of restrictive immigration policies. Tests of cross-level interactions pre-
sented in Model 6 of Table 2 show that in times of a stronger increase
of national debt, the effects of economic strain (γ = 0.001, p < .10) and
ethnic threat (γ = 0.001, p < .01) are stronger. This finding corroborates
H4a/b with regard to change in national debt. We did not find corre-
sponding conditional effects with regard to changes in the unemployment
rate (γ = 0.002, respectively, γ =−0.001, p > .10).
Conclusion and discussion
Driven by theoretical notions of ethnic competition theory, we examined
to what extent strong changes in national economic conditions affected
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natives’ support for restrictive immigration policies in 26 EU member
states between 2002 and 2013. This theory proposes that antagonism
toward immigrants is especially prevalent among vulnerable economic
groups who hold positions similar to migrants – and even more so
under competitive economic conditions. We argued that especially
sudden changes in economic conditions fuel natives’ restrictiveness. In
the long run, people may get used to the certain levels of unemployment
and welfare. However, sudden economic changes such as during the
recent financial-economic crisis may have ignited perceptions of econ-
omic strain and ethnic threat, which in turn fuel antagonism toward
immigrants (Olzak 1994; cf. Meuleman et al. 2009), and consequently
support for restrictive immigration policies.
Using large-scale data covering a more extensive time period than pre-
vious studies and virtually all member states of the EU, we found empirical
support for our hypothesis, derived from ethnic competition theory
(Blalock 1967; Scheepers et al. 2002), that restrictiveness toward immi-
grants is especially strong among vulnerable natives who are lower edu-
cated, manual workers, or unemployed. They perceive more economic
strain and more ethnic threat. Natives who perceive more economic
strain support more restrictive immigration policies. Much of the relation
between economic strain and restrictiveness is explained by perceived
ethnic threat. Natives who experience economic difficulties view ethnic
out-group members as a threat more strongly. In turn, these perceptions
of threat are related to support for restrictive immigration policies. These
findings underline the theoretical relevance of the mechanisms we
deduced, which is a rather innovative addition to this line of theorizing.
Ethnic competition theory traditionally emphasizes the mediating role
of perceived ethnic threat, perceptions that are especially prevalent
among vulnerable economic groups. We argued and showed that percep-
tions of economic strain in turn explain (part of) the relation between
individual natives’ socio-economic position and their perceptions of
ethnic threat. Moreover, economic strain directly affects the degree of
restrictiveness. To some extent natives perceive more threat from ethnic
out-groups because they face economic hardship themselves. This
finding especially holds for unemployed natives, whose restrictiveness
can be largely attributed to perceived economic strain and not solely to
perceived ethnic threat. That said, perceived ethnic threat remains the
strongest predictor of support for restrictiveness toward immigration
(cf. Schneider 2008).
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Recent increases of government debts are moderately related to stron-
ger public support for restrictive immigration, while recent increases of
unemployment did not affect restrictiveness. These economic changes
affected all socio-economic groups’ restrictiveness equally. However, we
found that in times of stronger national debts increases, natives who per-
ceive more economic strain and who perceive more ethnic threat actually
turn out to support more restrictive immigration policies. These are inter-
esting findings, because it shows that natives’ perceptions matter more for
anti-immigration attitudes than their actual socio-economic position. Fur-
thermore, national debt increases are likely to result in austerity measures
or at least to expectations of austerity measures – which generally lead to
budget cuts in the domain of social protection and employment. Under
these economic conditions, natives who are economically vulnerable or
perceive threat from ethnic out-groups do feel even more vulnerable or
threatened – feelings that actually ignite anti-immigration sentiments.
Our research shows that recent increases of immigration decrease
support for restrictive immigration policies among natives. This is an
odd finding from the perspective of ethnic competition theory, because
the theory would expect that increased immigration indicates ethnic com-
petition, inducing perceptions of threat which in turn would ignite out-
group hostility. Pettigrew et al. (2010) showed that the presence of
foreigners is also related to more positive interethnic contact, which in
turn decreases hostility toward foreigners, partially via decreased individ-
ual and collective threat. The question remains whether the same mechan-
ism is at work in times of sudden increases of immigration: basically, there
is very little time to build up interethnic contact. It could be that the nega-
tive correlation between recent increases of immigration and restrictive-
ness is actually a time-lagged derivative of previous waves of
immigration. Another explanation of the negative effect of changes in
immigration on support for restrictiveness regards the operationalization
of immigration. We treated immigrants as a general group, not dis-
tinguishing between Western and non-Western immigrants. Making
this distinction may be useful in future research. Furthermore, in their
meta-study of the effect of out-group size on anti-immigrant sentiment,
Pottie-Sherman and Wilkes (2015) found that perceived out-group size
is more likely to have a positive effect on anti-immigrant sentiments
than actual immigration. Hence, future research should consider includ-
ing both actual and perceived (changes in) immigration in their models.
Europe currently recovers from an economic crisis, not seen for many
decades. Following the logic of ethnic competition theory, one would now
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expect a decline of antagonism toward immigrants. Our findings show,
however, that economic conditions are not one-to-one related to
migration attitudes. The study suggests that economic recovery will be
associated to a decline in antagonism only if three conditions are met.
First, natives’ perceptions of economic competition should decrease to
the same extent as the objective decrease of economic competition. This
is not necessarily the case (Blalock 1967). Second, the economic recovery
should benefit all economic groups equally. If this is not the case, anti-
immigrant sentiments may persist or even increase in specific vulnerable
economic strata. Third, perceptions of economic ethnic threat should not
be ‘replaced’ by other forms of ethnic threat. If in times of economic pros-
perity, economic ethnic threats may become less salient but at the same
time perceived cultural and safety threats from particular ethnic out-
groups might become more salient. Hence, the net result may be the
same degree of antagonism toward immigrants. Should exclusionist atti-
tudes toward immigrants indeed persist, then social cohesion and solidar-
ity between ethnic groups may be impeded in Europe’s increasingly
diverse societies.
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